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Abstract
This paper explores the influences of Kosovo independence 
onto  the  Macedonian  political  scene,  more  specific  on  the 
model  for  managing  the  inter-ethnic  relations.  The  main 
question  that  the  paper  tries  to  answer  is  what  are  the 
implications  of  the  Kosovo  independence  in  Macedonia? 
Under  the  framework  of  the  theories  of  democratic 
transformation the paper explores the past ethnic politics in 
Macedonia and the developments with the status of Kosovo. It 
searches for the implications on the public perceptions and the 
policy  processes,  connected  with  the  Ohrid  Framework 
Agreement.  The conclusion points that the independence of 
Kosovo has effect on the public perceptions,  differently for 
the  Macedonians  and  Albanians  leaving  in  Macedonia.  As 
such Kosovo independence can influence the development of 
the policy areas connected with the relations between Kosovo 
and Macedonia,  but  is  unlikely to  influence  the  model  for 
managing inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia.
Keywords: Macedonia, ethnic politics, Kosovo, nationalism, Macedonian Albanians, 
public opinion
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Introduction
On February 17th, 2008 Kosovo declared independence, for many a sign of the final 
point of the brake up of Yugoslavia. In the period after, the US and the biggest EU 
Member States, many of the Balkan countries and other countries around the world 
recognized the independence of Kosovo. As Serbian official position is still “Kosovo 
je Srbija [Kosovo is Serbia]," the EU has deployed a mission that is deeply involved 
in the nation and state building of Kosovo.
Macedonia  until  the  end  of  May  2008  had  not  recognized  the  independence  of 
Kosovo.  Yet the main ethnic Albanian political  parties in Macedonia, but also the 
political leadership in Kosovo, expect that the recognition is a done deal. The relations 
between Skopje and Prishtina have been minimal in the early 1990’s. More recently, 
Macedonia has a history of interaction with Kosovo, during the war in Kosovo and 
the refugee crisis in 1999 and during the 2001 conflict in Macedonia. These cases 
were more of physical interaction, and involved less political influences between the 
two. As Macedonia has scheduled early Parliamentary elections on June 1st 2008, the 
issue of Kosovo recognition will be undertaken by the upcoming Government.
After  the  2001 conflict,  Macedonia  implements  the  Ohrid  Framework Agreement 
(OFA), an instrument for managing ethnic diversity, a new and innovative initiative 
considering the local and regional history3. Although the public opinion of the ethnic 
Macedonian and ethnic Albanians diverged on the OFA issue, both communities show 
similar  attitudes toward the  public  institutions.4 The stability and consolidation of 
Macedonia depends on a viable model for managing inter-ethnic relation. If the model 
sustains the test of time, it can be further used as a benchmark or best practice for 
other  places,  such  as  Kosovo.  The  viability  of  the  model  is  dependent  on  the 
development  and implementation of policies,  deriving from OFA, and also on the 
public support for this process. The model is influenced by different internal, but also 
external  factors.  The  independence  of  Kosovo  is  the  most  recent  arising  external 
factor.
This  paper  has  three  chapters.  The  first  part  unfolds  the  past  Macedonian  ethnic 
politics and the status of Kosovo using instruments from theories of transition and 
consolidation. The second part is an analysis of the public opinion in Macedonia from 
May  2007  to  May  2008,  focusing  more  particularly  on  the  views  of  the  ethnic 
communities  of  Albanians  and  Macedonians  in  the  Republic  of  Macedonia.  The 
analysis  encompasses  the  views  toward  Kosovo  in  various  aspects  from personal 
sentiments  toward  Kosovo  to  practical  issues  like  the  recognition  and  border 
demarcation. As a conclusion, the third and last part of the paper analyses the possible 
implications in Macedonia from the independence of Kosovo. 
3 Zidas Daskalovski, Walking On the Edge: Consolidating Multiethnic Macedonia 1998 - 2004, Skopje: 
Dominant 2005
4 Dane Taleski, "Minderheiten und Mehrheiten in Makedonien: Sichtweisen und Auffasungen der 
Bevölkerung [Minorities and Majority in Macedonia: Attitudes and Perceptions of the People] in 
Sudosteuropa-Jahrbuch: Inklusion and Exclusion auf dem Westbalkan [Southeast Europe Annual:  
Inclusion and Exclusion in the Western Balkans], eds. Ulf Brunbauer and Christian Voss, Munich: 
Südosteuropa-Gesselschaft e.V. 2008, pp. 263-280
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Macedonia’s Ethnic Politics and the Status of Kosovo
What are the implications for Macedonia of an independent status of Kosovo? Among 
the Eastern European countries Macedonia has had a distinct yet successful transition 
from  authoritarian  rule  to  democracy.  Unlike  most  of  the  former  Communist 
countries, Macedonia, together with Slovenia, and arguably Lithuania, experienced an 
evolutionary path to democratic rule.5  Yet, the peaceful and benign transformation of 
Macedonian society was preceded by an uneasy period of democratic consolidation. 
Among the different factors that negatively influenced this process were: the struggle 
for the international recognition of the country, the Greek diplomatic and economic 
pressure for the republic to change its name, the disruption of the economy due to the 
UN sanctions  on  Macedonia’s  main  trade  partner  Serbia,  as  well  as  the  financial 
impediments  as  a  result  of  the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia  and the Kosovo 
refugee  crisis.  None of  these  factors  bears  however,  as  strong  importance for  the 
consolidation of the democratic system as the disputing of the character of the state by 
Macedonian Albanians. 
Macedonia is without any dilemmas a multiethnic country. Besides Macedonians, the 
largest group in the country population comprising 64%, of the total population, there 
are also 25% Albanians, 3% Turks, and 2% each Roma, Serbs, and others.6 The vast 
majority  of  Macedonians  are  Macedonian  speaking  and  Orthodox,  as  are  the 
Macedonian Vlachs and Serbs. On the other side, most of ethnic Albanians, Roma, 
and  Turks  are  Muslims.  While  Macedonians  populate  the  whole  country,  ethnic 
Albanians are predominantly concentrated in the Northwestern corner of Macedonia, 
along the border with Albania. Macedonian Albanians also reside in the capital city of 
Skopje and the towns of Northern Macedonia along the border with Kosovo. Except 
Skopje, Macedonian Serbs also populate the region around the town of Kumanovo. 
The  other  ethnic  groups  are  dispersed  throughout  Macedonia.  Given  the  diverse 
character of its population and especially the relatively substantial size of the largest 
national minority,  the democratic consolidation in Macedonia was to be a difficult 
task to be accomplished.
Relations between Macedonians and ethnic Albanians have remained tense since the 
country’s independence. Much of the tensions resulted due to the different perceptions 
among the two communities about the underlying concept of the Macedonian state. In 
the  early  1990’s  both  Macedonians  and  Macedonian  Albanians  had  ambiguous 
feelings towards the disintegration of former Yugoslavia. Macedonians were cheerful 
for having secured independent statehood. On the other hand, they realized that the 
Macedonian state will face many obstacles from the more powerful neighbors. Since 
throughout history Macedonia’s neighbors have either consistently or at one time or 
another chosen to deny the existence of a Macedonian people, and hence its right to 
possess  its  own state,  and claimed Macedonia and the Macedonians as their  own, 
membership in Tito’s Yugoslavia provided Macedonians with a ‘sense of security, a 
5 On the topic in general and the understanding of reformatory change of the regime, see Kis “Between 
Reform and  Revolution”,  East  European  Politics  and  Societies,  1/1998,  p.323;  on  the  democratic 
transition  in  Macedonia,  see  Daskalovski  Z.  “Elite  Transformation  and  Democratic  Transition  in 
Macedonia and Slovenia” in Balkanologie,  September, 1999. 
6 For more details see the 2002 Census results from the State Statistical Office of the Republic of 
Macedonia (http://www.stat.gov.mk/english/glavna_eng.asp?br=18)
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sense of security both against unfriendly, even antagonistic states-Bulgaria, Greece, 
and to a certain extent Albania and against a condescending and patronizing partner 
and neighbor inside Yugoslavia, namely Serbia.’7
Similarly, for the Macedonian Albanians independence from Yugoslavia was both a 
blessing and a curse. On the one hand, with the dissolution of federal Yugoslavia and 
the  proclamation  of  the  Macedonian  independence  Albanians  from  Macedonia 
escaped the destiny of their Kosovo kin suffering under the strict rule of Slobodan 
Milosevic.  Within the fledgling political  system of  the Macedonian Republic they 
could influence domestic politics to a certain extent. At least in theory Macedonian 
Albanians were guaranteed all civil, political and social rights. On the other hand, 
however, Macedonian Albanians regarded the independence of the country and the 
new  frontiers  vis-à-vis  Serbia  as  an  unnatural  and  burdensome  obstacle  to  their 
relations with Kosovo Albanians. Ethnic Albanians in Macedonia perceive Kosovo 
Albanians as of sharing the same identity.8 In fact, during Tito’s times Pristina was a 
regional  center  for  all  Albanians  in  former  Yugoslavia  including  those  from 
Macedonia. Pristina University educated many of the political and social elites of the 
Macedonian Albanians. For example, Arben Xhaferi, the leader of DPA was educated 
in Pristina and for some 15 years he was a director of the province's TV station.
Although separated from their Kosovo kin, Macedonian Albanians have a perception 
that they are not a minority in the country. On the contrary they see themselves as 
equal  partners  to  Macedonians  and have ever  since  the  late  1980’s  asked  for  the 
aforementioned legal status. When in 1989 a new constitution was adopted defining 
the Socialist Republic of Macedonia as ‘the national state of the Macedonian nation’ 
rather than ‘the state of the Macedonian people and the Albanian and the Turkish 
minorities’ as it had stood before, Macedonian Albanians vehemently protested. When 
a similar formula was accepted in the Preamble to the 1991 Constitution Albanian 
political  elites  again  protested  against  these  developments  and demanded  that  the 
Albanian community living in Macedonia should be given a partner-nation status. 
Moreover,  ‘the  demographic  superiority  of  the  Albanians  over  the  other  ethnic 
minorities living in Macedonia is the main argument in their struggle to improve the 
status of the Albanian community’.9 Besides, ethnic Albanians present a significant 
percentage of the population in the areas they inhabit in Macedonia, representing an 
absolute majority in many municipalities in the Northwestern and Western parts of the 
country. Moreover, many Macedonian Albanians are claimed to be without citizenship 
although they have lived in the country for years if not decades, while also a number 
of ethnic Albanians from Macedonia have emigrated to Western Europe but keep a 
close contact with their places of origin. Treated as a ‘mere minority ethnic group’ 
Macedonian  Albanian  perceived  the  new  state  and  its  institutions  as  lacking 
legitimacy. 
7 See Rossos, Andrew, 2002, ‘The Macedonian Question and Instability in the Balkans’, in Norman N. 
Naimark and Holly Case, eds., Yugoslavia and Its Historians, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
p.104
8 See for example De Rapper, Gilles, 1998, Crisis in Kosovo: Reactions in Albania and Macedonia at 
the Local Level, Ethnobarometer Programme Working Paper No.3, Rome: CSS/CEMES.
9 See Babuna, Aydin, 2000, ‘The Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia: Ethnic Identity Superseding 
Religion’, Nationalities Papers, vol. 28, no. 1, p.83.
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On  the  other  hand,  throughout  the  post-independence  period  Macedonians  felt 
themselves  endangered  and  believed  that  granting  partner-nation  status  to  the 
Albanians  would  lead  to  a  Bosnia-type  situation.  Before  the  Ohrid  Framework 
Agreement Macedonians largely regarded the Republic of Macedonia as their nation-
state,  in  which  other  ethnic  groups  are  granted  equal  citizen  rights.  Macedonian 
political elites often argued that the minority rights for the ethnic Albanians in the 
country were on par with the highest standards of international legislation. Of especial 
concern to them was the fact that the percentage of the Albanian population in the 
country has significantly increased in the last decades. Before the conflict in 2001 
Macedonians  often  pointed  out  that  as  a  result  of  the  very  high  birth  rate  of 
Macedonian Albanians and the migration of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo in the 
period from 1953 to 1993,  the  number of  the  Albanians  had risen by 288,670 or 
189.2% so  that  in  1994,  the  percentage  of  the  Albanians  was  22.6% of  the  total 
population in Macedonia, compared to 1953 when this percentage was only 11.7. 
Partitioned during the Balkan Wars in 1912/3 Macedonians were faced with harsh 
assimilative  practices,  most  of  which  remain  intact  even  today  in  Greece  and 
Bulgaria. As a result of the long lasting repression Macedonians in these countries 
have been assimilated in great numbers. Macedonians in the Republic of Macedonia 
have thus felt  doubly threatened;  not only their  presence in the historic  region of 
Macedonia is rapidly dwindling but also, now that there exist a free Macedonian state, 
ethnic Albanians have vowed to overtake it both demographically and politically. By 
large, rather than anticipating sustainable peace or coexistence, ‘Macedonians remain 
mistrustful  of the Albanians’ true intentions… at  worst  they suspect  designs for a 
“greater Albania” (or, more commonly, “greater Kosovo”).’10 
Indeed, the foundations of the new state  in 1991 were not  fully supported by the 
Macedonian Albanians. The independence referendum turnout for example, was 72% 
and it is most likely that ethnic Albanians did not take part in it being persuaded by its 
partisan  leaders.  Paradoxically,  Macedonian Albanian politicians  were,  on the  one 
hand, content with the changes of the system and took an active part shaping it. Ethnic 
Albanian  legal  experts  were  involved  in  the  drafting  of  the  new  Macedonian 
constitution. Three ministers of the short-lived (March 1991- June 1992) non-partisan, 
‘cabinet of experts’ were chosen among the ranks of this minority. The 1992 coalition 
government  led  by Branko Crvenkovski’s  Social  Democratic  Alliance  (SDSM) as 
well  as  all  the  other  cabinets  since  included  one  ethnic  Albanian  party  with  five 
ministerial  posts.  Throughout  the  years  Macedonian  Albanians  took  increasing 
number of posts in the diplomatic service, public administration, the police and the 
army. Nonetheless,  ethnic Albanian politicians in Macedonia ‘in the early years of 
transition, adopted an obstructionist tactic.’11 
Thus, the new constitution did not pass an important internal test as it was not being 
approved  of  by  the  political  parties  of  Macedonian  Albanians.  The  special 
parliamentary  session  was  boycotted  by  the  PDP-NDP  (Party  for  Democratic 
Prosperity – National Democratic Party) to protest the preamble of the constitution 
which  formally  declared  Macedonia  to  be  ‘the  national  state  of  the  Macedonian 
people, providing for the full equality of citizens and permanent coexistence of the 
10 See Fraenkel, Eran, 2003, ‘Macedonia’, Nations in Transit 2003, New York: Freedom House, p.403.
11 Hislope, Robert, 2003, ‘Between a Bad Peace and a Good War: Insights and Lessons from the Almost 
–War Macedonia,’ Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 26, no. 1, p.139.
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Macedonian people with Albanians, Turks, Roma, and other nationalities’. Formerly, 
under the socialist constitution, the preamble defined Macedonia to be a nation of ‘the 
Macedonian people and the Albanian and Turkish minorities’ and in 1991 Macedonian 
Albanians felt that they have been demoted as they were not explicitly mentioned 
being constitutive nation along Macedonians.
As a matter of fact during the 1990’s the Macedonian political elites clashed with their 
ethnic  Albanian  counterparts  over  the  basic  idea  behind  the  concept  of  the  state. 
Various elements in the constitution, the census taking, the laws on education, local 
self-government, and public display of national minority symbols, the ethnic make-up 
of  the  police,  army,  as  well  as  the  public  administration,  were  all  contested  by 
Macedonian Albanians in this period. These are all constituent parts of the idea behind 
the Macedonian republic, the fundamentals which in all liberal states are accepted by 
the general public or at least by the principal sectors within. 
Justice  in  liberal  in  ethnically heterogeneous  states  is  provided if  the  state  is  not 
understood as a ‘nation-state.’  In an ethnically divided society: 
“the state which treats every citizen as an equal cannot be a nation state: it must be a co-nation 
state.  It  cannot  be  identified  with  a  single  favored  nation  but  must  consider  the  political 
community of all the ethnic groups living on its territory as constituting it. It should recognize 
all of their cultures and all of their traditions as its own. It should notice that the various ethnic 
groups contend with  unequal  initial  chances for  official  recognition and a share of public 
authority, and it should offer particular assistance to the members of disadvantaged groups in 
approaching a position of equality. The privileges which are meant to countervail the initial 
disadvantages are inevitably lasting (since the inequality of the relationships of force between 
the state-forming groups are also lasting) and they might need to be expressed as rights”12 
A plural state is more legitimate the more all its citizens and not only the majority 
consider the territory of the state their own homeland, the legal system of the state and 
their institutions, the insignia of the state as their own symbols. These are goods to be 
jointly  shared with  all  of  the  other  citizens.  The political  community of  a  liberal 
democratic but multicultural country will be just if:
"it is formed from a union of ethnic groups living together. Its official symbols, holidays, its 
cultural goods handed down in school, and its historical remembrance will absorb something 
from the tradition of all the ethnic groups belonging to it, so that everyone can see the state is 
also theirs: likewise, everyone can see that the state is not their exclusive possession but is 
held jointly with the other ethnic groups forming it"13
In  this  context,  the  demands  by the  Macedonian  Albanians  can  be  interpreted  as 
wanting such  a  just  union.  Indeed,  when one looks at  the  claims put  forward  by 
political representatives of Macedonian Albanians one finds many which can be well 
suited in a just framework of relations in a multiethnic state.  In the last ten years, the 
key demands of the Macedonian Albanians which became a bone of contention with 
the  central  government  were:  reform of  the  constitution,  greater  representation  of 
Macedonian Albanians in the civil service sector, provision of university education in 
the Albanian language, and decentralization of state power.14 Certainly, reforms were 
enacted  and  improvements  were  made  as  the  participation  of  the  Macedonian 
12 Kis, Janos 1996. “Beyond the National State”. Social Research. 63:1, pp. 224-5.
13 Ibid, p.237.
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Albanians in the civic sector has risen in the last years.  Similarly, a law was passed 
allowing private education in other  languages than Macedonian while  a European 
financed trilingual university (Albanian, English, Macedonian) was opened in 2001. 
However,  these  changes  have  not  been  sufficient  for  the  political  parties  of  the 
Albanians in Macedonia.
While  Macedonians  have  kept  insisting  on  a  unitary  nation-state  Macedonian 
Albanians have refused to be considered an ethnic minority in a Macedonian nation-
state and have advocated for official bi-nationalism. Although Macedonia recognized 
the rights of national minorities and promoted pluralism in the media, native-language 
education, minority civil society organizations, and interethnic power sharing in the 
national  government  living  standards  sank  as  unemployment  soared.  Under  such 
circumstances the political transformation was formulated as a zero-sum game, pitting 
ethnic Albanian grievances against Macedonian fears for “their” country’s security 
and integrity. 
Linz and Stepan have noted how difficult is to consolidate a regime if a significant 
group  of  its  citizens  is  actively  disobedient.  On  different  occasions  Macedonian 
Albanians have not accepted claims on its obedience as legitimate, thus presenting 
serious  problems  for  democratic  consolidation.  Neither  did  considerable  political 
crafting of democratic institutions and norms took place in Macedonia between 1991-
2001.  Macedonian  politicians  avoided  ‘complex  negotiations,  pacts,  territorial 
realignments or consociational agreements’ with their ethnic Albanian colleagues. On 
the contrary, at instances the government undertook drastic measures to uphold laws 
which  were  deemed  controversial.  The  government  did  not  act  upon  Linz’s  and 
Stepan’s recommendation that to consolidate democracy in a plural society requires 
the state attention to the needs of national minorities. With a major segment of the 
population challenging the very foundations of the state, Macedonia, before the 2001 
Ohrid Framework Agreement and the subsequent adoption of the amendments to the 
1991 constitution could not consolidate its democracy.
Despite  the  unresolved  inter-ethnic  questions  Macedonia  surprised  analysts  and 
diplomats when it almost surged into a full-blown civil war in the first half of year 
2001. Led by Ali Ahmeti, the previously unknown National Liberation Army (NLA) 
was a motley group of former Kosovo Liberation Army fighters from Kosovo and 
Macedonia,  Albanian  insurgents  from the  Southeast  Serbian  regions  of  Preshevo, 
Bujanovac and Medvedja, young Albanian radicals and nationalists from Macedonia, 
and  foreign  mercenaries.  From February  to  August  2001,  the  NLA organized  an 
armed insurrection against the Macedonian government.  Following a prolong warfare 
and  with  emotions  running  high  among  government  officials  and  ordinary 
Macedonians  and Macedonian  Albanians,  the  danger  of  civil  strife  was  real.  The 
international community, led by the European Union, reacted swiftly bringing to life 
the Ohrid Framework Agreement and the pacification of the NLA. 
14 See, for example, the reports by the International Crisis Group. 1999. Towards Destabilisation? ICG 
Balkans Reports No. 67 (May 1999), Skopje/Brussels, and  Macedonia’s Ethnic Albanians: Bridging 
the Gulf, ICG Balkans Reports No. 98 (August 2000), as well as Farimah Daftary. 2001a. “Testing 
Macedonia”.  ECMI Brief # 4. European Centre for Minority Issues, Flensburg and 2001b. “Conflict 
resolution in FYR Macedonia: Power-sharing or the ‘civic approach’”. Helsinki Monitor. no. 4.
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What did the Framework agreement stipulate? The main goal of the Ohrid Agreement 
has been to accommodate the grievances of the Albanian community,  while at the 
same time preserving the unitary character of the state thus addressing the concerns of 
the Macedonian majority who fear a ‘federalisation’ of the country and its eventual 
disintegration. The accord envisioned a series of political and constitutional reforms 
designed to address ethnic Albanian demands for equal standing. Consequently, the 
amendments to the 1991 constitution based on this agreement gave clear picture to the 
rights of national minorities and especially ethnic Albanians. The major provisions 
include: amending the preamble to the Constitution, instituting double-majority voting 
in parliament, increasing the representation of ethnic Albanians in the police force, 
and  stipulating  the  use  of  the  Albanian  language  in  official  proceedings.  Other 
provisions from the Ohrid Agreement stipulate fulfillment of much of the demands 
raised  by  the  Macedonian  Albanians  throughout  the  1990’s  and  introduced  some 
features of power sharing, such as a system of double majorities requiring consent 
from  minorities  represented  in  parliament  to  key  decisions  of  the  Parliament,  a 
substantial degree of municipal decentralisation, equitable representation in the public 
administration  of  the  non-majority  communities,  as  well  as  confidence-building 
measures to overcome the immediate consequences of the 2001 conflict.
Effectively, the legal changes based on the Ohrid agreement gave clear picture to the 
rights of national minorities and especially ethnic Albanians. On a symbolic level, a 
significant  step  forward  was  made  when  in  November  2001  the  changes  to  the 
constitution were voted by the political representatives of Macedonian Albanians. The 
Macedonian  paramount  legal  document  is  now  legitimized  in  the  eyes  of  ethnic 
Albanians. Other provisions from the Ohrid Agreement stipulate fulfillment of much 
of the demands raised by the Macedonian Albanians throughout the 1990’s. Having 
solved the dispute over the character of the country, and the new government having 
implementing  the  provisions  of  the  Framework  Agreement,  it  is  assumed  that 
Macedonian Albanians as a significant and crucial group of citizens in Macedonia will 
not have an interest  in disobeying the institutions of the state and that democratic 
consolidation is largely accomplished.
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Kosovo  Independent:  Implications  on  the  Public  Opinion  in 
Macedonia
The wealth of information in the public space provides for a constant engagement in 
communication processes. According to Harold Lasswel, the communication process 
fulfills  "three  main  functions  in  society:  a)  surveillance  of  the  environment  that 
provides warning about imminent threats and dangers to the system of values of a 
community or its parts;  b)  correlation of the parts of society in responding to the 
environment; and c) transmission of the social heritage from one generation to the 
next  or  cultural  transmission".15 In  the political  sphere  the second function of  the 
communication process is present on a daily base. The political environment changes 
under influence of different factors which have responses among the public, however 
in  this  process  the  public  is  not  only the  reflection  of  the  changes,  an  inevitable 
outcome,  but  also  an  important  factor  influencing  the  changes  in  the  political 
environment. In their work Jeff Manza and Fay Cook, overview the possible influence 
of the public opinion on the policy processes. They suggest that the underlying logic 
is to what extent is the influence present, rather than if there is any influence at all. 
Taking in consideration the existing literature on the opinion-policy link, they detect 
three sets of options: 1) public opinion has a significant and enduring effect on the 
policy process; 2) public opinion has a small and declining effect and 3) there are 
historical and institutional variations in responsiveness.16  
The proponents of the first option use mainly quantitative studies to show "association 
between majority opinion and the adoption of new policies", while the proponents of 
the  second  believe  that  public  opinion  is  weak  on  policy  issues  and  thus  it  is 
constructed through polling and surveys.17 The third option is an in- between approach 
based on ’relativity’ logic.  Namely,  the proponents of this  theory suggest  that  the 
influence of  the public opinion varies over  time and space,  and is  specific  to  the 
policy dimensions. The three theoretical approaches are not mutually exhaustive in 
practice, they combine and overlap. As the research findings reflected in this paper 
reflect the link does depend on the importance of the policy area to the public and in 
that respect the link or influence can be strong or weak. On a general level, Manza 
and Cook find that the three theoretical approaches "reach fundamentally different 
conclusions that can not be easily reconciled".18 
Our analysis does not intend to argue for or against such a conclusion, as not enough 
cases are explored, and sufficient variations to determine a supporting or contradicting 
argument are not presented here. This study is locked on to one policy dimension, and 
that is a pivotal point rather than the overall link between public opinion and policy 
processes. The following part of the paper analyzes the results from five distinctive 
data sets, deriving from five opinion polls done from May 2007 to May 2008. All 
opinion polls were conducted on nation- wide representative samples (N=1000+) with 
respondents over 18 years of age. However, we should mention that one has been 
15 Mattelart, Armand and Mattelart, Michéle Theories of Communication, London: Sage Publications 
1998, pp.29
16  Manza, Jeff et al Navigating Public Opinion, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002
17  Manza, Jeff and Cook, Fay  “The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: The State of the 
Debate„ In: Jeff Manza et al. Eds. Navigating Public Opinion, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 
pp. 17
18 Ibid: pp.28
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conducted through face-to-face interviews, while the others were done over the phone. 
The  results  from  these  surveys  on  the  perception  of  the  Kosovo  status  and  the 
implications for(in) Macedonia are taken as the basis for the analysis of the Kosovo 
independence on the public opinion and public policy in Macedonia. In that respect, 
the public policy that is most likely expected to be influenced is the recognition of the 
Kosovo  independence.  Another  point  of  the  analysis  is  whether  the  Kosovo 
independence will have effect on other policy areas, and in particular, multi-ethnic 
relations in Macedonia.
From  May  4th  to  11th  2007,  the  Institute  for  Democracy  in  Skopje  (IDSCS) 
conducted a phone poll, asking the respondents questions concerning the perceptions 
of the public toward the reconciliation processes in Macedonia and in the Western 
Balkan  region,  the  orientation  of  Macedonian  foreign  policy  and  the  personal 
closeness of the citizens toward specific countries and international organizations. The 
survey was done for the purposes of the research project "Securing the Community: 
Reconciliation, Trust and Integration in the Western Balkans" led by Dr. Suzette R. 
Grillot from the University of Oklahoma and was conducted on a standardized nation 
wide representative sample which has been stratified according to the representative 
regions in the country. The structure of the sample has been modeled to best fit the 
data from the last National Census conducted in the Republic of Macedonia in 2002. 
A total of 1,115 adult persons randomly chosen have been surveyed.
The results of the survey confirm the previously stated point- that most of the ethnic 
Macedonians are not fully content with the way that the conflict in Macedonia was 
settled. Although the perceptions are divided whether the conflict was successfully 
resolved the majority agree that a return of violence in Macedonia is quite unlikely. In 
the  same  time  the  poll  showed  very  different  perceptions  of  Macedonians  and 
Macedonian  Albanians  toward  Kosovo.  The  results  relevant  to  this  paper  are 
presented in the tables 1 to 3 below and in graph 1.
In table 1 we see that for 12.4% of the Macedonians the conflict in Macedonia in 2001 
was very successfully settled, however 38.7% say that the conflict settlement was 
very unsuccessful. At the same time 8.6% of the Macedonian Albanians said that the 
conflict  was  very  successfully  settled,  while  28.4%  said  that  it  was  very 
unsuccessfully settled.
Table 1. Have the conflicts in your country been successfully settled?
Macedonians Albanians Total 
Very successful 12.4% 8.6% 11.6%
Somewhat successful 23.3% 41.4% 28.4%
Somewhat unsuccessful 17.9% 20.1% 18.8%
Very unsuccessful 38.7% 28.4% 35.2%
NA/DK 7.7% 1.5% 5.9%
Source: IDSCS phone poll, May 2007, N=1115 
The differences in this respect are not that grave, however 41.4% of the Macedonian 
Albanians consider that the conflict settlement was somewhat successful, compared to 
23.3% of the Macedonians. While the opinion of the Albanian community is split on 
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the issue, within the Macedonian community the majority inclines to the perception 
that the conflict was unsuccessfully resolved.
However, neither the Macedonians, nor the Macedonian Albanians believed in May 
2007 that a return of violence is possible in Macedonia.
Table 2. Will the coming years in Macedonia be peaceful, or do you think that there will be a 
return to violence?
Macedonians Albanians Total 
Peaceful 59.6% 75.0% 64.2%
Violence 24.1% 18.7% 22.0%
NA/DK 16.3% 6.3% 13.8%
Source: IDSCS phone poll, May 2007, N=1115 
While close to 60% of the Macedonians think that the coming years will be peaceful, 
even higher 75% of the Macedonian Albanians agree. The skeptical view is a bit more 
found among the Macedonians (24.1%), but also among the Macedonian Albanians 
(18.7%).
Regarding citizens feelings towards Kosovo there is a great divergence among the 
Macedonians and the Macedonian Albanians. While the Macedonian Albanians have 
predominantly positive views on Kosovo, the Macedonians view it strongly negative.
Table  3.  Please  rate  your feelings  regarding  Kosovo  on  a  scale  1  (very  negative)  to  5  (very 
positive).
Macedonians Albanians Total 
1 (very negative) 40.4% 3.0% 30.7%
2 (negative) 20.6% 5.2% 16.7%
3 (indifference) 16.7% 12.7% 16.5%
4 (positive) 5.9% 26.9% 11.1%
5 (very positive) 4.8% 51.5% 16.1%
NA/DK 11.6% 0.7% 9.0%
Source: IDSCS phone poll, May 2007, N=1115 
A bit  over  40%  of  the  Macedonians  said  that  they  had  very  negative  feelings 
regarding Kosovo,  while  additional 20% said that  they had negative feelings.  The 
situation is opposite among the ethnic Albanians. Some 51% said that they have very 
positive feelings regarding Kosovo, and close to 27% said that they have positive 
feelings. The polarization is complete if one takes a look in the opposite direction as 
well. Only 3% of the Macedonian Albanians had very negative feelings for Kosovo, 
and 5% said that they have negative feelings, while some 5% of the Macedonians said 
that they have very positive feelings and additional close to 6% said that they have 
positive  feelings.  In  the  total  sum  the  negative  feelings  outweigh  the  positive; 
however, the difference is not that high as it is when comparing perspectives of the 
respondents from the two ethnic groups. The poll showed that the Macedonians and 
Macedonian Albanians have diametrically opposite views on the perception toward 
Kosovo.  High  majority  of  the  Macedonians  (over  60%)  have  generally  negative 
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feelings for Kosovo, while high majority of the Macedonian Albanians (some 78%) 
had generally positive feelings for Kosovo.
The IDSCS's survey also compared the ratings of the feelings on a median scale for 
all  of  the  countries  and organizations  that  the  respondents  were asked  to  provide 
answers. In this comparison, as seen in graph 1 below, Kosovo has the lowest ranking 
from all countries and organizations. This shows that Kosovo is at the lower end of 
the list of positive perceptions in Macedonia.
Graph 1.  Please rate your feelings regarding the following countries/organizations on a scale 1 
(very negative) to 5 (very positive).
Source: IDSCS phone poll, May 2007, N=1115 
From December 8th to 17th, 2007 Brima Gallup, for the purpose of the People Centered 
Analysis Report of the UNDP Skopje office, conducted a face-to-face survey on a 
nation wide multi-stage random probability sample of the adult population. A total of 
1309  respondents  were  interviewed.19 The  results  from  this  poll  show  that  the 
resolution of the final status of Kosovo was a top priority for about 10% of the ethnic 
Macedonians personally. Accordingly, 10% of the Macedonians considered that this is 
of  importance  to  the  Macedonian  ethnic  group.  In  the  same  poll  35%  of  the 
Macedonian  Albanians  said  that  the  resolution  of  the  final  status  of  Kosovo  is 
important for them personally, while 51% said that it is of top priority for the interest 
of the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia. The difference of 16%, not found among the 
Macedonians,  could  be  due  to the  fact  that  "substantive  share  of  ethnic  Albanian 
community  feels  under  pressure  to  report  more  ethnically  rooted  options  are 
priorities".20 Generally, the results show that as time was unfolding, the resolution of 
the final status of Kosovo was a much higher personal priority for the Macedonian 
Albanians in Macedonia and also a perceived priority for that ethnic community in 
Macedonia, while among the Macedonians that perception was quite low both on a 
personal and on a community bases.
19 See for example United Nations Development Programme “People Centered Analysis„ Report March 
2008 (also available at http://www.undp.org.mk/Default.asp?where=news&id=403&start=1)
20 Ibid: pp. 54
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This poll showed also some other interesting results considering the perception of the 
risk of inter-ethnic conflict in Macedonia. Over 50% of the Macedonians said that 
there is a high risk of inter-ethnic conflict, while another 30% said that there is a low 
risk of conflict. Below 20% of the Macedonian Albanians though that there is a high 
risk of inter-ethnic conflict, while close to 40% said that there is a risk of inter-ethnic 
conflict.21 These answers also relate to the possibility of an inter-ethnic. Some 80% of 
the Macedonians and 60% of the Macedonian Albanians believed that there are some 
risks for inter-ethnic conflicts in Macedonia. However, when asked about the risk of 
ethnic conflict on a local level the positive answers diminish to 30-40% among the 
Macedonians and the Macedonian Albanians. The divergence of answers shows that 
the two biggest ethnic communities see more problems for the ethnic relations on 
national than on local level. One explanation for this could be that in the views of the 
people the local factors are less potent and that the situation is better on the local 
level,  that  the national  developments  and the situation on national  level,  which is 
closely connected to the regional developments. However, another explanation could 
be that there were no rising ethnic problems on the local level, but there is a presence 
of fear of conflict due to national politics or regional developments.
In early March 2008, the Agency for Public Opinion Research and Communications 
Rating from Skopje, conducted a phone poll on a nation wide representative sample 
with 1045 adult  respondents.  Among the other  things the respondents  were asked 
‘when should Macedonia recognize the independence of Kosovo.’ The answers show 
that the public is quite divided, while some asked for immediate recognition, other 
said that the Kosovo should never be recognized while most say that the recognition 
should happen. The detailed results are found in table 4 below.
Table 4. Should Macedonia recognize the independence of Kosovo
Macedonians Albanians Total 
Right now 3.4% 89.7% 24.4%
After few months 7.9% 3.7% 7.2%
Never 33.9% 0.8% 26.1%
After  the  border 
demarcation
49.9% 5.0% 38.4%
NA/DK 4.9% 0.8 3.9%
Source: Rating Agency, March 2008, N=1045
The results show that overwhelming part of the Albanian population in Macedonia, 
some 90%, requested immediate recognition of Kosovo, a position supported by only 
3%  of  the  Macedonians.  One  third  of  the  ethnic  Macedonians  thought  that  the 
recognition  of  Kosovo  should  never  happen,  while  the  majority  or  close  to  50% 
thought  that  the  recognition  of  Kosovo  should  happen  once  the  border  between 
Macedonia  and  Kosovo  is  clearly  drawn  and  recognized.  The  results  display  the 
strong will and request of the ethnic Albanians leaving in Macedonia, for the Republic 
of Macedonia to support the independence of Kosovo. On the other hand, the view of 
a smaller part of the Macedonians was never to recognize Kosovo, while the majority 
requests  conditioning the  recognition with the  demarcation of  the  border  between 
Kosovo and Macedonia.
21 Ibid, pp. 62, graph 3.3: The risk of ethnic conflict
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From March 6th to 8th 2008, the Center for Research and Policy Making (CRPM), 
conducted a phone poll with 1,100 respondents aged 18+. The phone poll was made 
on a nation wide representative sample. The result showed that most of the population 
objected the recognition of Kosovo, and also that majority considered that the border 
demarcation should precede the official recognition. However when asked about the 
implications on the security situation in Macedonia, after the Kosovo recognition the 
answers of the public are quite dispersed.
The table below gives a glimpse of the results on the questions whether Macedonia 
should  recognize  Kosovo.  Similarly  to  the  results  of  the  Rating  agency,  the  poll 
showed  that  about  95% of  the  Macedonian  Albanians  support  the  recognition  of 
Kosovo, while majority of the Macedonians (some 60%) oppose it.
Table 5. Should Macedonia recognize Kosovo as independent country?
Macedonians Albanians Total 
Yes 16% 95% 35%
I do not care 5% 1% 5%
No 60% 1% 45%
NA/DK 18% 3% 15%
Source: CRPM, March 2008, N=1100
In  this  poll  the  demarcation  of  the  border  again  was  an  important  factor  that 
influences the answers of the ethnic Macedonians. To the question "Should the border 
be marked before Kosovo is recognized?” some 55% answered positively, while 30% 
said that the recognition of Kosovo independence is more important than the border 
demarcation. There is clear polarization in the answers of the ethnic communities. 
Most of the Macedonians (74%) said that the border demarcation needs to be finished 
before Kosovo is recognized, while most of the Macedonian Albanians (85%) said 
that the recognition of Kosovo is more important than the border demarcation. The 
public interpretation of these results range from the fact that the ethnic Macedonians 
see  a  safeguard  mechanism  against  Kosovo  expansionist  policies  in  the  border 
demarcation to be concluded before the independence of Kosovo is recognized, to the 
belief of the ethnic Albanians that the recognition is a needed immediately so as to 
support Kosovo. The fact that the Macedonian Albanians insist on sooner than later 
recognition despite that the border is not fully marked, has been interpreted as an 
indication of what the “real Albanian motives” for Kosovo to be recognized are. In 
this regard the motivation to recognize Kosovo and not insisting to first  mark the 
border is interpreted as being only a prelude to staging territorial demand on parts of 
Macedonia. 
However, these views, found across the public discourse in Macedonia, are not shared 
among the  general  population.  In  fact,  the  people  do not  see  a  clear  and present 
implication for the security in Macedonia if the Kosovo is recognized. The scenarios 
for Albanian secession are not dominantly shared among the public as being realistic. 
In the poll the answers to the question of the implications on the Macedonian security 
if Kosovo is recognized are fully dispersed across the spectra of possible answers. 
This conclusion is supported from the results displayed in graph 2 below.
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Graph 2.  Implications on the security in Macedonia if Kosovo is recognized
Source: CRPM, March 2008, N=1100
From all  respondents  27.5% expect  improvement  of  the  security  once  Kosovo  is 
recognized, 25% say that nothing will happen, and 25% believe that the security will 
worsen.  Predominant  part  of  the  Macedonian  Albanians  (82%)  believe  that  the 
security situation will improve once the independence of Kosovo is recognized, while 
32% of the Macedonians said that they expect that the situation will worsen. To some 
extent these results support the so far supported thesis that the ethnic Albanians in 
Macedonia are radically and uncritically in favor of the recognition of Kosovo. They 
want immediate recognition and expect positive improvements from it.  The ethnic 
Macedonians  are  more  skeptical-  even  if  they  are  not  against  the  recognition  of 
Kosovo per  se,  they have reserves  concerning the  security of  Macedonia  and are 
clearly  focused  on  having  the  border  demarcation  done  before  anything  else  is 
finished.
These are again some of the findings of the CRPM's phone poll done on 24th and 25th 
of April 2008. The poll was done on nation wide representative sample of 1,100 adult 
respondents. The answers to the question on the recognition of Kosovo are displayed 
in the table below.
Table 6. Should Macedonia recognize Kosovo as independent country?
Macedonians Albanians Total 
Yes 20.3% 92.8% 41.4%
No 47.0% 3.5% 34.1%
NA/DK 32.5% 3.5% 24.5%
Source: CRPM, April 2008, N=1100
A predominant  part  of  the  Macedonian  Albanians,  over  90% want  Kosovo  to  be 
recognized, while just below 50% of the Macedonians object to that idea. However, in 
the same time some 20% of the Macedonians said that Kosovo should be recognized, 
while close to one third remained silent. The undecided, silent group could swing in 
any side, pro or contra the recognition. Having in mind the current and past ethno-
centric behavior in Macedonia, it is more likely that the 'silent' ones will oppose the 
recognition or at least condition it, rather than giving full support for it.
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What will happen to the security in Macedonia if Kosovo is recognized?
On average most of the population agrees that Macedonia should recognize Kosovo, 
while the resistance is also quite substantial. In April 41.4% of the population said that 
Kosovo should be recognized, while in March in the previous mail this percent was 
35%. In the same period the  opposition  to  the  recognition declined from 45% in 
March 2008, to 34% in April. The results are displayed in the graph below.
Graph 3.  Attitudes in Macedonia on the recognition of Kosovo
Source: CRPM, March and April 2008, N=1100
The  shift  of  opinions  and  attitudes  has  been  observed  mostly  among  the  ethnic 
Macedonians. On the one hand, the position of the ethnic Albanians has not seen any 
dramatic  changes.  Over  90%  of  the  Macedonian  Albanians  were  and  remain 
supportive of the idea to recognize the independence of Kosovo. However, among the 
Macedonians in March 2008 some 60% opposed the recognition of Kosovo, while in 
April 2008 only 47% of the Macedonians said that they are against the recognition of 
Kosovo. Generally, the opposition to the Kosovo independence has decreased. It is 
quite unlikely that in one month slightly over 10% of the ethnic Macedonians have 
shifted from opposing the recognition of Kosovo independence to supporting it. But is 
more likely that in one month they have shifted from opposing the recognition of 
Kosovo  to  being  'silent'  and  not  giving  a  specific  answer,  be  it  for  or  against 
recognition.
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Kosovo Independent: Implications for Macedonia?
 
How much Macedonia should be concerned with the independence of its northern 
neighbor?  Certain events since the birth of Macedonia in 1991, like the Bit  Pazar 
demonstrations in 1993, the clashes surrounding the opening of the “University of 
Tetovo” in 1994, as well  as the so-called Gostivar flag riots in 1997 indicate that 
interethnic conflicts might indeed be dangerous for the vitality of the Macedonian 
state. Bearing in mind that quite a few Albanians in Macedonia are closely related to 
the Kosovan Albanians we can imagine the fear among many Macedonians especially 
since during the war in Kosovo in 1999 many young Macedonian Albanians joined 
the  ranks  of  KLA fighting  the  Serbian  forces,  while  villages  on  the  Macedonian 
border to Kosovo became their logistical bases. For Macedonians there is a strong 
feeling  that  ‘inter-Albanian’  informal  organization  transcends  international 
boundaries. The popular view holds that this solidarity results from a shared ideal to 
create a Greater Albania.
   
Indeed given that Albanians living in Macedonia are closely related to the Albanians 
in Kosovo there is a strong and important link between Macedonia’s and Kosovo’s 
political  developments.  Nationalistic  discourse  makes us  believe that  for  Albanian 
radicals  the  current  Kosovan  territory  is  not  where  the  imagined  border  of  the 
“liberated”,  “great”,  Albanian  state  should  be.  The  main  question  concerning 
Macedonian stability is therefore what kind of repercussions an independent Albanian 
Kosova would have on the interethnic relations in Macedonia?   Should Skopje fear 
Albanian nationalism if Kosovo becomes a sovereign state? Could there be a repeat of 
the warlike crisis that hit Macedonia in 2001? 
The answer is clear. Macedonia’s leadership should not be worried with Kosovo being 
granted independence. This is mainly so because the conditions and the factors that 
led to the outburst of ethnic violence in Macedonia in 2001 are not prevalent at the 
moment. Some major issues have been modified or solved. The interplay of internal 
and external factors that led to the beginning of a mini-war in the winter of 2001 can 
hardly repeat itself now.22 Macedonia is a more mature interethnic democracy and an 
EU membership candidate country. 
There are a number of reasons supporting this assessment. Let us briefly discuss the 
outburst  of  hostilities  in  the  winter  and  spring  of  2001.  As  previously  discussed 
Macedonian Albanians and their political leaders have since independence fought for 
specific  political  rights  for  their  ethnic  community  including  changes  of  the 
constitution. When in 1998 the Social Democratic Alliance then in coalition with the 
Party for Democratic Prosperity lost power among many citizens of Macedonia there 
were hopes that the economic conditions and the interethnic relations will improve. 
Ethnic Albanians assumed that their political demands will be fulfilled. Three years 
later many of them were dissatisfied since the largely corrupt government coalition 
between VMRO-DPMNE and DPA did not fulfill the expectations of the Albanians in 
22 See more in debt in Zhidas Daskalovski Walking on the Edge: Consolidating Multiethnic Macedonia 
1989-2004, Globic: Chapel Hill, 2005 or ibid, The Macedonian Conflict of 2001: Between Successful  
Diplomacy, Rhetoric and Terror, Studies in Post-Communism Occasional Papers, St. Francis Xavier 
University: Antigonish, 2004.
17
Macedonia  for  faster  reforms  that  would  improve  their  status.23 In  early  2001,  a 
number of young Albanians from Macedonia were radicalized to an extent that they 
were ready to fight for the nationalist cause. 
Some of these young Albanians either directly or indirectly participated in the war in 
Kosovo in 1999, logistics being still functional in the winter of 2001. The routes for 
transfer of weapons or soldiers across the borders in the triangle between Kosovo, 
Macedonia and Southern Serbia were functional at that time.24 Many Albanians across 
the border in Kosovo were ready to help brothers in Macedonia. In addition, in early 
2001, the Serbian security forces pushed away the armed Albanian rebels from the 
regions  of  Preshevo  and  Bujanovac  adding  new  possible  recruits  for  staging  an 
uprising against  Macedonia.  Accidentally,  at  that  time Macedonia signed a  border 
agreement with the then existent Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Since the agreement 
also confirmed the borderline between Macedonia and Kosovo, it was understood by 
Albanians in these regions as a kind of a provocation. The agreement was especially 
unnerving for those Albanian groups that object to a well defined border because of 
their clandestine activities across the border. 
The great number of ethnic Albanian discontents needed a leadership and they easily 
found one. Following the war in Kosovo leading figures and one of the founders of 
the Kosovo Liberation Army, coming from Macedonia like Ali Ahmeti, Fazli Veliu, 
did not win any spoils neither in Kosovo nor in Macedonia. Ahmeti and Fazliu were 
influential among the Albanian Diaspora in the 1990’s and instrumental in gathering 
funds to finance the struggle of the KLA. They and many Albanians from Macedonia 
that fought in Kosovo, and Southern Serbia but personally gained little or nothing had 
an interest in starting a moderately intense warfare in order to achieve benefits denied 
elsewhere.25 Combining these facts with the availability of small arms in Macedonia, 
typically used for guerilla type of warfare and the porousness of the border one gets 
the picture why the war in Macedonia started in the winter of 2001.
Today in Macedonia such a configuration of factors does not exist. Although illegal 
weapons  are  still  available  to  some extent,  hot  spots  in  particular  regions  of  the 
country  existent  and  radicalism  among  segments  of  the  Albanian  population  still 
strong, Macedonian Albanians enjoy the benefits of the reforms enlisted in the 2001 
Ohrid Framework Agreement and implemented since. All the political elites accept 
the workings of the political system despite occasional dissatisfactions with electoral 
results  or  functioning of  particular  governments.  Notwithstanding the  enlargement 
fatigue suffocating Europe, Macedonia is  firmly entrenched on the EU integration 
path being granted the candidate status in the winter of 2005. Awaiting a date for 
beginning of  negotiations  with  the  EU,  a  unique success  multiethnic  story of  the 
Balkans, Macedonia has the support of the whole international community. Lastly, the 
independent status of Kosovo is conditioned by a responsible policy making of the 
23 See for example, Brenda Pearson, "Putting Peace into Practice: Can Macedonia's New Government 
Meet the Challenge?" (US Institute for Peace Special Report, November 2002) or International Crisis 
Group, “Macedonia’s Public Secret: How Corruption Drags The Country Down”, Europe Report 
N°133, 14th August 2002.
24 See for example Robert Hislope “Between a Bad Peace and a Good War: Insights and Lessons from 
the Almost-War in Macedonia,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, v.26, n.1, (January 2003).
25 See at Timothy Garton Ash, „Is There a Good Terrorist?„, The New York Review of Books, November 
29, 2001 and in „Ali Ahmeti„, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Ahmeti.
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local elites. These factors negatively influence the possibility of an outburst of new 
violence in Macedonia following Kosovo’s declaring a status of a sovereign state. 
Although we cannot absolutely guarantee such an outcome this analysis makes as 
believe that Macedonia should not fear from the independence of Kosovo. 
However,  the  views  and  perceptions  of  the  ethnic  communities  in  Macedonia 
regarding the recognition of  Kosovo remain diverged and even polarized.  For the 
great  part  of  the  ethnic  Macedonians  independent  Kosovo  brings  negative 
reminiscences. The Macedonians show greater worries for a possible development of 
an inter-ethnic conflict. Their perceptions are not at all connected to local politics but 
more to the developments on a national level and regional developments, such as the 
status of Kosovo. While most of the ethnic Macedonians believe that the return of 
violence is quite unlikely in Macedonia, they believe that the independence of Kosovo 
may have negative results for the security in Macedonia. For such reasons some of 
them oppose  the  recognition of  Kosovo,  while  the  ones  that  would  be  willing  to 
accept it, state that the border between Kosovo and Macedonia has to be clearly set 
before the recognition takes place.
A great majority of the Albanians from Macedonia, close to 90%, have strong positive 
feelings for Kosovo and want the recognition to happen sooner than latter. Most of 
them believe that with the recognition of Kosovo the security will be improved. Same 
as  the ethnic Macedonians they do not  believe that  violence is  likely to occur  in 
Macedonia in the future, and they too see a greater possibility for inter-ethnic conflict 
on national than on local level. However, their support for the recognition of Kosovo 
is high, strong and uncritical. For them the demarcation of the border between the two 
countries  is  not  essential.  Most  of  them  considered  it  secondary  to  the  act  of 
recognition. The views of the Macedonian Albanians have not changed in the last 
year, but it is quite possible that for some of them recognizing Kosovo is a pressing 
issue due to their solidarity with the views and attitudes of their ethnic-community 
across the border. In that respect some of the Macedonian Albanians do not see any 
clear personal gain for them with the recognition of Kosovo. However, due to the 
wider Albanian empathy with the Kosovo recognition they opt to strongly support it.
The views of the ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians will have effect on the 
Macedonian  policies  concerning  Kosovo,  and  the  recognition.  The  Macedonian 
Albanians are pressing for fast recognition while the Macedonians are conditioning it 
with the border demarcation. These views and pressures are not mutually exclusive, 
they apply to the same policy process and it would be needed for both to be included, 
which would slow down the implementation of the policy. In short, Macedonia is very 
likely to recognize Kosovo once the border line has been clearly set. In the mean time 
no meaningful political actor or institution object the recognition of Kosovo or leaves 
doubts that it will happen. This could be the main reason why in one month time there 
has been a 10% change in the active views of the Macedonians toward the recognition 
of Kosovo's independence. 
Not only that there are no objections, but some political actors have strongly, openly 
and publicly demanded recognition of Kosovo. Namely, all Albanian political parties 
in Macedonia are unanimous that Kosovo needs to be recognized as soon as possible. 
After his temporary withdrawal from the governing coalition in March 2008,  Menduh 
Thaci the leader of DPA, came back in the coalition Government with six demands, of 
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which one was the recognition of Kosovo. It is interesting to note that the other five 
demands  applied to  the  status  of  the  rights  of  Albanians in  Macedonia,  i.e.  were 
political demands related to domestic political issues. In the same manner, DUI the 
strongest political party of the Albanians in Macedonia, during the campaign for the 
early elections in June 2008 has demanded recognition of Kosovo and introduced the 
policy in  its  election  campaign.  Similar  to  DPA,  DUI  is  introducing  the  issue  of 
Kosovo recognition on the domestic political scene in Macedonia. The reaction of the 
political parties of the Albanians shows accommodation to the views and needs of the 
ethnic Albanians. In general, the political parties of the minorities in Macedonia are 
mono-ethnic, functioning as interest seekers, and willing to enter various coalitions to 
meet  their  rational and pragmatic interest  and needs.26 In that  respect the political 
parties of the Albanians in Macedonia are accustomed to using ethno-mobilization 
especially during election campaigns. They are not forgoing an opportunity to request 
recognition  of  Kosovo  when  the  overwhelming  majority  of  the  Albanians  in 
Macedonia support that and regard it as an important priority.
It is quite likely that the future policies of Macedonia in its relations with Kosovo will 
be influenced in similar ways as the issue of recognizing the independence of Kosovo. 
Most likely the ethnic Albanians will be strongly in favor, while the Macedonians will 
be more skeptical to developing stronger ties to Kosovo, being concerned of various 
implications that the development of such relations may cause. The underlying factors 
of the Macedonian behavior are the strong negative sentiments toward Kosovo, to a 
lesser extent,  and to a greater  extent  the fears that  the Kosovo independence and 
further on the development of relations between Kosovo and Macedonia will cause 
the  appearance  of  'Greater  Kosovo'  or  'Smaller  Macedonia'.  Beside  the  negative 
sentiments, for the Macedonians the negative implications on the security are still 
seen as possible and thus the development of relations will not be favored. In that 
respect the Macedonian Albanians will push for fast development of stronger relations 
with Kosovo, even taking the regional lead, while the Macedonians will push for a 
more cautious and slower approach.
The public opinion toward the policy area of developing relations with Kosovo is 
influenced by two factors, temporal and symbolical. The symbolical can be defined as 
a two-fold approach, one for the ethnic Macedonians and the other for the ethnic 
Albanians.  The Macedonians need the act  of  border  demarcation as  a  symbol  for 
security, while the Albanians support the independence of Kosovo as a symbol of the 
commonness among the Albanians. The temporal factor shows that as time unfolds 
the eventuality of Kosovo independence was seen as a possible negative influence to 
the  security  and  inter-ethnic  relations  in  Macedonia.  However,  since  the 
independence, the practice has shown that there has been no influence on the security 
and inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia. Possibly, in the future as time progresses and 
relations  develop  between  Macedonia  and  Kosovo,  the  perceptions  of  a  possible 
negative influence on the security and inter-ethnic relations will be changed. In the 
mean  time  the  independence  of  Kosovo  can  not  play  an  important  role  since  as 
previously explained the post-Ohrid Framework system in Macedonia provides for 
consolidation and inter-ethnic cooperation. Kosovo plays a limited role as a symbol 
for ethno-political mobilization for the political parties of Albanians, but as long as 
the system set within the Ohrid Framework Agreement for managing the inter-ethnic 
26 See for more in Dane Taleski “Minorities and Political Parties in Macedonia”, in Political Parties  
and Minority Participation, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: Skopje, 2008 (forthcoming)
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relations is functioning, Albanians from Macedonia are more likely to go Prishtina via 
Skopje.
21
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